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Inequality is not a necessary condition for growth. Indeed,
inequality  is associated  with slower  growth  - perhaps  because
increased inequality  causes more conflict over distributional
issues, encouraging  greater economic  intervention  and higher
taxes.
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This paper  - a product  of the Transition  and Macro-Adjustment  Division,  Country  Economics  Depart-
ment-  is part  of a larger  effort  in the  department  to understand  the determinants  of economic  growth.  The
study was funded by the Bank's Research  Support Budget  under research project "How Do National
Policies  Affect  Long-Run  Growth?"  (RPO  676-66).  Copies  of the paper  are  available  free  from the  World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Rebecca Martin, room Ni 1-054,
extension  39065 (December  1992,  28 pages).
Inequality  is often regarded  as a necessary  evil  term  between  the type of regime  and inequality
that has to be tolerated  to allow  growth,  says  is included  in the base regression,  it is insignifi-
Clarke.  The view that inequality  is necessary  for  cant at conventional  significance  levels.
the accumulation  of wealth,  and contains  the
seeds of eventual  increases  in everyone's in-  * The cross-country  data on inequality  follows
comc is evident in "trickle  down"  economic  Kuznets'  inverted-U  shape.
theories,  where societal  acceptance  of inequality
allows the rich  to camn  a greater rate of return  on  Care should  be taken in interpreting  these
their assets.  results. Although  inequality  is negatively  corre-
lated with growth,  this does not necessarily
Others argue  that inequality  slows growth  - imply that "soak-the-rich"  policies  will improve
because  increased  inequality  causes  more  long-term  growth.
conflict  over distributional  issues,  thereby
encouraging  greater  economic  intervention  and  First,  theoretical  work on inequality  and
higher  taxes.  growth  stresses  that this negative  correlation  is
caused  by high levels  of inequality  provoking
According  to Clarke,  the empirical  evidence  high levels  of government  economic  interven-
shows  that:  tion. Soak-the-rich  policies may  be less neces-
sary where  there is less inequality.
- Inequality  is negatively,  and robustly,
correlated  with growth.  This result  is robust  to  Second,  although  the partial  correlation  is
many different assumptions  about  the exact form  robust,  the direction  of causality  has not been
of the cross-country  growth  regression.  determined  and the effects  of specific  income
distribution  policies  have not been tested.
* Although  statistically  significant,  the
magnitude  of the relationship  between  inequality  Finally,  if policies designed  to decrease
and growth  is relatively  small.  Decreasing  inequaiity  result in greater  government  consump-
inequality  from one standard  deviation  above  to  tion and the cost of increased  government
one standard  deviation  below the mean increases  consumptions  outweighs  the benefits  of greater
the long-term  growth  rate by about 1.3  percent-  equality,  long-term  growth  may be harmed.
age points a year.
But for certain: inequity  is not a prerequisite
* Inequality  has a similar effect in democra-  for growth.
cies and non-democracies.  When  an interaction
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I.  Introductin
Inequality is often regarded as a necessary evil which has to be tolerated to  allow growth.
Adelman  and Robinson  (1989)  state "it has been argued  that inequality  is necessary  for accumulation,  and
that it therefore contains the seeds of eventual increases  in everyone's income".'  This view is evident
in "trickle down" economic theories where societal acceptance  of inequality allows the rich to earn a
greater rate of return on their assets, encouraging  them to accumulate  wealth faster; some of which can
be redistributed  to make everyone wealthier.  In the Harrod Domar model, if the rich save a greater
share of income  than the poor,  transfers of wealth from rich to poor reduce capital accumulation,  thus
leading to slower growth. 2 In contrast, Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1990)
argue  that inequality  actually slows growth.  This is because increased  inequality  causes greater conflict
over  distributional  issues, thereby encouraging  greater government  intervention  into the economy and
higher  taxes. This lowers  the rate of return on private assets, restricting  capital  accumulation  and slowing
growth.  Both Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1990) confirm these theoretical
predictions with cross country growth regressions. 3 However, a  well known property of  these
regressions is that results are highly dependent upon the other variables included in the regression
(Levine and Renelt (1992)).
This paper argues that the empirical  evidence supports  the assertion  that inequality  is negatively
associated with long run growth.  This result is robust to many different assumptions  about the exact
form of the cross country growth regression.  In addition, this observed negative correlation is not
dependent  upon political regime - whether a country is a democracy  or not.  When an interaction  term
Adolman and Robinson, p951.
a Fiolds(1989), p173.
' In addition Pwrson and TabeDini  (1990) confirm  teir  reult  with a
historic  panel data  set.2
between  type of regime and inequality  is included in the base regression, its coefficient  is insignificant.
This indicates, in contrast to Alesina and Rodrik (1991), that inequality  has a similar effect on both
democracies  and non democracies.  The paper is set up as follows: the second section of the paper
discusses properties of  the  inequality data,  including Kuznets'  Inverted U  hypothesis and simple
correlations with other variables.  The third section shows preliminary results from cross country
regressions  with inequality measures included.  In the fourth section the robustness of the correlation
between inequality  and growth is tested using a variant of extreme bounds analysis. The final section
discusses  results and makes final comments.
H.  Properties  of the Inequality  Data
In order to include "inequality"  in cross country growth regressions, the abstract concept of
inequality  needs to be quantified. Since there is no single universally accepted measure of inequality,
various measures are constructed  to test that results are not dependent  on inequality  being measured in
a particular way.  The measures  are the coefficient  of variation  (COEFFVAR),  Theils' index (THEIL),
and the Gini coefficient  (GINI). Additionally,  the ratio of the share of total income  earned by the poorest
forty percent of the population  to the share of total income earned by the richest twenty percent of the
population, the measure used in both Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1990), is
computed.
The Gini Coefficient,  probably  the most common  inequality  measure, is derived from the Lorenz
curve, a graphical  device  which represents  inequality  in a society. The Lorenz curve plots F(z), the share
of population  with income less than z, against +(z) the share of total income  of people with income less
than z.  It is important  to note that this curve must lie below the 45 degree line.  For example, suppose
F(z) =  1/h  and that 4(z)  >  1/z,  this would imply that the poorer half of the population  earned more than
half of total income, which therefore is more than the richer half could earn.  The Gini coefficient  is3
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twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree line (See Figure l).
In order to describe the other two measures it is useful to suppose there are n persons in the
population  with incomes Y,,Y2.  .. ,y3. The variance  of the incomes  may seem an intuitive  way to judge
how spread out incomes  are from the mean. However  multiplying  all incomes  by a factor of n increases
the variance  by a factor of n squared. So, for example  a society where half the population  earned $4 a
year and half $60 would be (four times) more unequal  than if half the population  earned $2 and half $30.
The coefficient  of variation (COEFFVAR)  corrects this problem by dividing the square root of variance
by the mean income.
In information  theory the entropy of a system is defined as:
where pi is the probability of event i occurring and h(p;) is the "value" of knowing event i occurred.
It is defined  as twice  the  area  so that  it is between  O  and 1.  When  yi= l/n  for  adl  i then  it is  the 45 degre  line  and  the  Gini  Coefficient
is zero,  when  one  person  earns  all  income  then  4(z) = 0 fbr  z < y. and  O(z)  = I when  z =  y,. Hence  the  Gini  coefficient  for  this is 2*(area
between  45 degree  line  and  x axis)  - 2*(%)  = 1.4
(1)  Coefficient  of  variation  c  =  C_  n_
(2)  ENTRaDY  = E  pi  *h(pi)  - Epi  1ogp 1
Theil proposed an inequality  measure whtm,e  si, person i's share of total income, is substituted  into the
entropy equation  for pi . The "entropy"  of the income  distribution  reaches a maximum  when sj= 1/n for
all i, that is when income is evenly distributed 5. Theils' index, a measure of inequality, is defined as
the "entropy" of income distribution  when s;= l/n for all i, less the "entropy" of the observed  data.
(3)  Theils'  Index=  - '.*log  1)  - (  - Es,*log(sd)
Properties  of these indices  have been discussed  in the literature on inequality.6  For all measures,
the more equitably income is distributed, the lower the measure's value.  It should be noted that the
measures, other than the ratio are designed to be computed on entire populations.  Since this data is
unwieldy  and less available than the decile income shares, these measures  were calculated  as if within
deciles income is distributed evenly.  In general, the Gini coefficient, the coefficient  of variation and
Theils' index may be preferable to the ratio measure since they utilize more information. A shift in
income shares between deciles within the broad groups of the poorest forty percent, the richest twenty
percent or the middle forty percent of the population, while not affecting  the ratio, changes  the other
measures.
Although these measures  give different values and even different orderings for countries in the
sample, they are very highly correlated.  (See Table 1).  In particular the coefficient  of variation and
Theils index are extremely  highly correlated.
S Real that  the  Si's are  constrained  to add  to one.
65 ee for example  Cowell  (1977). Or for properdes  of the  Gini coefficient,  Lambert  (1989).5
As an initial exercise, table 2 shows the simple  correlations  between  the inequality  variables and
Barro regressors  and other related  variables 7. Exc., ' for per capita GDP, which is negatively  correlated
with growth, and enrollment  rates in secondary,  and to a lesser extent primary, education, no variables
Table 1: Simple  Correlations  of Inequality  measures.
aini  Coeffirar  Theil  RTP40
alai  1.00  0.97  0.97  0.91
Cooffvar  1.00  0.99  0.87
The_  1.00  0.94
RTP4O  1.00
TABLE  2: Simple  Correlations  with Barro Regressors  and other Variables
Variable  obs  Corr.  w/  T stat  # obs  Corr w/  T stat
GINI  RTP40
ASSP7085  75  -0.031  -0.26  83  -0.035  -0.31
REVC708S  75  -0.045  -0.39  83  -0.012  -0.11
8GoV7088  76  -0.061  -0.53  84  -0.050  -0.45
sLNV7088  76  -0.106  -0.92  84  0.002  0.02
C57088  8l  0.068  0.61  90  0.003  0.03
SODPPC7O  75  -0.319  -2.87  82  -0.255  -2.36
LGDPPC70  75  -0.216  -1.89  82  -0.131  -1.18
CPRIM60  82  -0.166  -1.51  89  -0.095  -0.89
CSEC60  82  -0.373  -3.59  89  -0.317  -3.11
SODPPCIY  72  -0.354  -3.16  77  -0.290  -2.63
LODPPCIY  72  -0.225  -1.94  77  -0.162  -1.42
SCONIY  72  0.083  0.69  77  0.024  0.21
SGOVIY  72  -0.208  -1.78  77  -0.170  -1.49
SNVIY  72  -0.120  -1.01  77  -0.039  -0.34
'  The measures denoted xxxxxlY are measured in the same year as the inequality  measures for each countfy.  SCONIY is private
consumption  as percent of GDP, slNvn  is investment  as percent of GDP, SGoVIY  is government  consumption  as percent of GDP  and
SODPPCIY  is per capita GDP and LGDPPCIY  is the  log of per capita GDP.  AU  measures  are from Surmmers  and Heaton  (1991).6
are highly correlated with inequality.  Private consumption (SCONIY) and  investment (SINVIY)
measured  for each country in the same  year as the inequality  measures  are both insignificantly  correlated
with inequality.
Government consumption (SGOVIY) also measured for each country in the same year as
inequality  is negatively  correlated  with the Gini coefficient 8. If slower  growth in countries with greater
inequality were caused "i  greater government intervention in the economy, one may hope to find a
significant  relationship  between  greater inequality  and large government.
A final aspect  of the data regarding the level of development,  not the growth rate, is whether the
data appears  to follow  Kuznets' inverted  U shape. Kuznets'  inverted U hypothesis  asserts inequality  first
increases, and then decreases, as per capita income increases. Various cross country studies  have tested
this hypothesis and have generally supported  it.9 It has been suggested  that this result is driven by the
high negative  correlation  between  inequality  and wealth among  developed  countries, and that the increase
in inequality  observed among the poorer of the less developed countries is largely illusionary." 0 Even
if one accepts the hypothesis, questions  exist about its causes.  The shape may be structural, perhaps
caused by a shift from an agrarian base to an industrial  base, or could be policy induced." 1 The data
used in this study appears to follow the inverted U shape, but the cause of this relationship  is not clear.
As is customary  the hypothesis is tested using log values of GDP.  In all four cases when Log GDP is
regressed on the inequality  measures its coefficient is negative. However, coefficients  on two of these
' However  this result is very weak since  the correlation  is only  significant  at a two tailed significance  level  of ten percent for two of the four
measures,  Thei  and Giai.  The other two measures are insignificantly  correlated  with soovIY  instilling little confidence  in this result.
Additionally.  this result appears  to be driven  by one country,  Suriname. When  this point is excluded  from the sample  the correlation  becomes
insignificant.
I See Lecallion  et al. (1984), Chapter  one, for a survey  of some  of these studies.However,  as noted in Easterly,  King, Levine  and Rebelo
(1991),  results from intertemporal  studies  have  not supported  the hypothesis.  Since  the relationship,  as it was formulated  is intertemporal,  these
studies  would seem a more appropriate  way of testing  the hypothesis.
'° LecaUion  et al, p14-15.
"Adelman and Robinson  (1989), p955-57 argue  that the initial increase  in inequality  is caused by a shift from agriculture  to industry,  but
that the following  decrease  if it occurs is due to policy decisions.7
measures  are not significant  at the five percent level  (See Table 3).  When squared Log GDP per capita
is  added to  the regression, the regressions' R-Squared term becomes significantly larger and the
coefficients  on both Log GDP per capita and Squared Log GDP per Capita become highly significant" 2
(See Table 4).  This result agrees with previous studies which find that in cross country comparisons,
the average level of inequality  is lower in both very poor and rich countries, than in moderately  poor
countries."  The turning point, where average inequality  appears to begin to decrease with increased
wealth varies between $1433 for the coefficient  of variation, and $1826 for the ratio measure in 1985
prices.  This empirical regularity  does not necessarily  prove the existence  of either an intertemporal,  or
structural relationship  between level of development  and inequality. The data suffers from the usual
problems  relating  to poor quality, as well as additional  problems  caused  by comparing  income  distribution
data for households  and for individuals  and using approximations  of inequality  measures. The "Inverted
U" relationship  for the Gini Coefficient  is shown in figure 2.
Table  3: Regression  of Inequality  variables  on Log of ODP  per Capita
Dep. Variable  GENI  COEFFVAR  THE8L  RrP40
No of Obs  72  72  72  77
Constant  0.6102  1.6801  0.7177  7.3076
l  ___________________  (6.85)  (6.53)  (4.42)  (3.24)
LODPPCIY  -0.0220  4.0950  -0.0461  -0.4076
(-1.94)  (-2.89)  (-2.22)  (-1.42)
0.05  0.11  0.07  0.03
12 Third and fourth  powers  of log GDP  per capita  are insignificant  when added to the regression.
" See for example  Ahluwahlia  (1976).8
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Table  4: Regression  of Inequality  variables  on Log  of GDP  per  Capita  and Squared  Log  of GDP  per  Capita
Dep. Variable  olNI  COEFFVAR  THEIL  RTP40
No of Obs  72  72  72  77
Consant  -1.6683  -4.8235  -3.3680  -47.346
(-2.68)  (-2.67)  (-2.96)  (-3.02)
LGDPPCIY  0.5780  1.6178  1.0299  13.924
.___________________  (3.54)  (3.43)  (3.45)  (3.41)
LUDPCIY2  -0.0390  -0.1112  -0.0699  -0.927
(-3.69)  (-3.64)  r-3.62)  (-3.52)
0.21  0.23  0.21  0.179
III. Regression  Results
Table 5 presents the first set of cross country growth regressions. The inequality  variables are
added to a "Barro type" growth regression including  variables  to proxy political instability  levels, levels
of human capital, size of government  and initial GDP per capita.
Table 5: Ordinary  Least Squares Results for Barro Type Regression with Inequality Variables.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Dep.  Var  L0PC7088  L0PC7088  LOPC7088  L0PC7088  L0PC7088
# of Obs  81  74  74  74  81
Constant  0.0154  0.0533  *4  0.0394  **  0.0537  **  0.0255 *
(1.47)  (3.14)  (3.10)  (3.53)  (2.29)
SUDPPC70  -0.0023 *  -0.0026  *  -0.0026*  -0.0Q27 *  -0.0025 **
l_______________  (-1.84)  (-1.79)  (-1.83)  (-1.89)  (-2.04)
REVC7085  -0.0017  -0.0040  -0.0044  -0.0050  -0.0030
________________  (-0.18)  (-0.43)  (-0.47)  (0.55)  (0.31)
ASSP7085  -0.0385  **  -0.0511  **  -0.0527 **  0.0531  4*  -0.0405 **
l______________  (-2.03)  (-2.27)  (-2.37)  (-2.41)  (-2.20)
PP170DVN  -0.0053  4  -0.0059  **  -0.0062  **  -0.0063  **  -0.0058 *
______________  (-1.95)  (-2.28)  (-2.42)  (-2.48)  (-2.18)
CPRIM60  0.0134  0 9116  0.0127  0.0121  0.0175
l__________________  (1.22)  (1.05)  (1.16)  (1.12)  (1.63)
CSEC60  0.0282  0.0193  0.0152  0.0122  0.0178
(1.57)  (0.94)  (0.74)  (0.59)  (0.98)
SGOV7088  -0.0426  -0.0595 **  -0.0606 **  -0.0604  **  -0.0479*
(-1.51)  (-2.00)  (-2.06)  (-2.08)  (-1.74)
GIN!  -0.0691 **
l________________  (-2.59.)
THEIL  -0.0438 **
(-2.91)
COEFFVAR  -0.0298  *
(-3.15)
RTP40  -0.0022  **
(-2.26)
R-Squared  0.23  0.32  0.34  0.35  0.28
4  t datistic  significant at  10% level
44 t  stAtistic  significant at 5% level10
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The dependent  variable is the least squares  growth  of rate of GDP per capita  (where GDP is taken
from BESD,  the World  Bank data base). The independent  variables  are initial  GDP per capita in constant
dollars, from Summers  and Heston (1991)  (SGDPPC70),  primary and secondary  enrollment  rates lagged
ten years (CPRIM60  and CSEC60),  the average  number  of revolutions  and coups per year between 1970
and 1985 (REVC7085),  the number of assassinations  per million  population  per year between 1970 and
1985 (ASSP7085), the deviation of the price level for investment in  1970 from the sample mean
(PPI70DVN)  from Summers and Heston (1991)4 and average government  share of GDP between 1970
and 1988  (SGOV7088V) 5.
" This is the price purchasing  parity measure  divided  by exchange  rate relative  to the United States.
" Barro (1991)  uses governmentshare  of ODP  from Summers  and Heston (1988)  less experditureon defenseand education. The measure
used here, from Summers  and Heston  (1991), is lightly  different  in  that it does not exclude  expenditure  on defense  and education. The measure
used in Berro is not used since it is available  only over a shorter subperiod  and for a smaller  subseample  of countries.11
In table 5,  the coefficients  on all inequality  measures are significantly  negative. For all of the
inequality measures, as  inequality increases the value of the measure increases.  These negative
coefficients  indicate that increased inequality is correlated with slower long run growth.  A primary
concern is that one or two outliers may be driving the result.  To show this is not the case, a partial
scatter of the residuals  from growth and the Gini coefficient  regressed  on the Barro variables  is presented
in figure three."  This appears  to confirm  that the result is not driven by one or two outliers.
Another  concern is heteroskedasticity.  This hypotheses  is tested using  a Breusch-Pagan  Lagrange
multiplier test with GDP per capita and a Goldfeldt Quandt test  7.  In the Goldfeldt Quandt test, the
observations were ordered by  GDP  per  capita and  the ten  middle observations (twelve middle
observations  for RTP40)  were dropped. The results which  reject the null hypothesis  of homoskedasticity
are presented below." 8
To correct for heteroskedasticity,  the following two regressions are run: OLS with Whites'
heteroskedastic  consistent  standard errors, and weighted  least squares weighting  by (I/GDP per capita)
squared. Correcting  for heteroskedasticity  does  not change  the sign or significance  of the results. In both
cases  the coefficients  on all inequality  variables  remain  significantly  negative  at conventional  significance
levels.  In addition, throughout  the rest of the analysis, Whites' Heteroskedastic  Consistent Standard
Errors are used.
6 Results  are similar  for the other inequality  measures.
17The variation of the Breusch  - Pagan test suggested  by Koenkar(1981)  and Koenkar  and Barrett(1982)  which may be more powerful  in
the absence  of normally  distributed  errors is used.
'In  the extended  regression  listed in table 10 the null hypothesis  of homoskedasticity  was also rejected. For the Goldfeldt  Quandt test the
middle  eight  (nine for RTP40)  observations  were dropped,  and in each case the null  hypothesis  of homoskedastic  errors was rejected  at the five
percent level. For the Breusch  Pagan  test on GDP  per capita  the null  hypothesis  was rejected  at the five percent  level for GnMI  and RTP40 and
COEFFVAR,  and at the ten percent  level for THEIL  (significance  level of 0.0510).12
Table  6: Testng for heteroskedastioity  in the residuals  from the Barro  type regression
H0: Errors are distributed  homoskedastioaly
H,: Errors are distnbuted  beteroskedastically
GOLDFELDT  QUANDT  Test Statistic  Significance  Lovel
w/ included variable
GMIN  F (23,23) = 8.30  0.000
THMIL  F (23,23) = 8.08  0.000
COHFFVAR  F (23,23) =  7.80  0.000
RTP40  F (26,26) - 4.82  0.000
BREUSCH PAGAN TEST
w/includod variable
GIN!  CMI  SQUARED  (1) = 4.54  0.033
TH81L  CMI  SQUARED  (1) =  4.51  0.033
COBFFVAR  CHII  SQUARED  (1) =  4.40  0.036
RTP40  CIM  SQUARED  (1) = 5.49  0.019
Table 7:  OrdinaLy  Least Squares  with  Whito  Heteroskodastic  Consistent  Standard  Errors  for 8aro  Type Regression  with Incquality  Variables.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Dep.  Var  LOPC708S  LGPC7088  LaPC70s8  LaPC7088  LaPC7088
# of Obs  81  74  74  74  81
Constant  0.0154  0.0533"  0.0394"  0.05371  0.0255* 
(1.45)  (3.64)  (3.34)  (3.98)  (2.19)
SaDPPC70  -0.0023  -0.0026 *  -0.0026  -0.0027  *  -0.0025*5
(-2.20)  (-2.01)  (-2.06)  (-2.10)  (-2.52)
REVC7085  -0.0017  -0.0040  -0.0044  -0.0050  -0.0030
(-0.17)  (-0.37)  (-0.41)  (-0.48)  (-0.28)
ASSP708S  -0.038S5  -0.0SI  I'  -0.0527  0.0531 "  -0.0405S
(-2.27)  (-2.25)  (-2.31)  (-2.32)  (-2.43)
PP170DVN  -0.0053  -0.0059  -0.0062  -0.0063  -0.0058  *
(-1.82)  (-1.87)  (-1.97)  (-1.99)  (-1.90)
CPRIM60  0.0134  0.0116  0.0127  (1.30)  0.0121  0.0175*
(1.35)  (1.16)  (1.25)  (1.77)
CSBC60  0.0282  *  0.0193  0.0152  0.0122  0.0178
(1.91)  (1.23)  (0.97)  (0.78)  (1.27)
SOoV7088  -0.0426  -0.0595  *  -0.0606  -0.0604  -0.0479
(-1.23)  (-1.73)  (-1.78)  (-1.79)  (-1.40)
amN  -0.0691 




___________________ ___________________  __________________  (-3.53)  _______________353
RTP40  -0.0022"0
RTP40_____________  ___________________  __________________  (-2.40)
R-Squaed  0.23  0.32  0.34  0.35  0.2913
Table  8: Weighted  Lem Squae  (with l/DPr2  as tho weight)  for Barro Type  Regresion with Inequality  masures.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Dop. Var  LOPC7088  LaPC7088  LaPC7088  LoPC70s8  LGPC7O88
IofOba  e1  74  74  74  81
Consnt  0.0197 O  0.0466  0.0362  0.0456  0.0343 *
(I .99)  (3.84)  (3.59)  (4.05)  (3.33)
SaDPPC70  40.0014  - -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0009  -0.0002  '
(-2.37)  (-1.07)  (-1.16)  (-1.25)  (-3.52)
RBVC7085  -0.0134  -0.0130  -0.0130  -0.0118  -0.0165  *
__________________  (-1.33)  (-1.45)  (-1.47)  (-1.35)  (-1.74)
ASSP7085  -0.0189  -0.0239  -0.025S  -0.0261  -0.0261
(-0.86)  (-1.07)  (-1.15)  (-1.19)  (-1.27)
PP170DVN  -0.0098  O  -0.0100  *  -0.0101  -0.0097'  -0.0087
(-1.76)  (-1.98)  (-2.00)  (-1.95)  (-1.66)
CPRIM60  0.0059  0.0055  0.0052  0.0053  0.0073
(0.65)  (0.67)  (0.64)  (0.65)  (0.85)
CSBC60  0.0019  0.0064  0.0046  0.0045  0.0167"
(2.68)  (0.73)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (2.50)
S0oV7088  -0.0369  O  -0.0447O  -0.0455  -0.0458  -0.0405  *
l________________  (-1.71)  (-2.17)  (-2.24)  (-2.28)  (-2.01)
GIN  -0.0589"




____________  ~(-3.85)_  _  _  _  _  _
RTP40  -0.2741*
__________________  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  ___________________  ___________________  _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  (-3  .34)
R-Squued  0.64  0.72  0.72  0.73  0.68
Even under ideal conditions  inequality  data is perceived  as poor quality. In this case the problem
is exacerbated by using income distribution  data from different sources, for different income receiving
unit, and for different  years. Some observations  are from the early seventies  (and a few from the eighties
for RTP40), hence endogeneity  may be a concern.  To correct these problems, two stage least squares
is performed.  In addition to the Barro regressors the following instruments  are used:  a dummy for
socialist economies (SOC from the Barro Wolf data set), a dummy  for African  countries, a dummy for
Latin American countries, log of initial per capita GDP and squared log of initial per capita GDP (from
Summers  and Heston (1991)). Using these instruments,  the coefficients  are slightly  more negative  than14
Table 9: Two Stage Least  Squares for Barro Type regression  and Inequality  variables  using Barro regressors,  Log of per capita ODP, Squared
Log of per capita GDP, Africa dunmmy,  Latin  America  dummy and Socialist  Government  dummy  as instruments.
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Dep.  Var  LGPC7088  LOPC7088  L()PC7088  LOPC7088
# of Obs  72  72  72  79
Constant  0.08266  **  0.0526 *  0.0721 **  0.0350 *5
(2.96)  (3.11)  (3.23)  (2.53)
SODPPC70  -0.0032  *  -0.0032  **  -0.0033  **  -0.0030  *
_______________  (-2.00)  (-2.02)  (-2.14)  (-2.20)
REVC7085  -0.0084  -0.0080  -0.0088  -0.0047
(-0.82)  (-0.81)  (-0.89)  (-0.47)
ASSP7085  -0.0542  **  -0.0566 *  -0.0574  *0  4.0436 **
- (-2.31)  (-2.45)  (-2.53)  (-2.26)
PP170DVN  -0.0060  *  -0.0064  -0.0065  **  -0.0061  s
(-2.23)  (2.42)  (-2.51)  (-2.20)
CPRIM60  0.0165  0.0172  0.0160  0.0220 *
(1.38)  (1.46)  (1.40)  (1.87)
CSEC60  0.0113  0.0082  0.0059  0.0124
(0.46)  (0.33)  (0.24)  (0.60)
SOV7088  -0.0725  *  40.0714  **  -0.0710  *  -0.0556  *
(-2.27)  (-2.28)  (-2.32)  (-1.90)
GINI  -0.1265**
(-2.47)




RTP40  -0.0041 e
(-2.21)
R-Squared  0.32  0.34  0.35  0.2815
in the OLS regressions,  and all measures remain significant  at the five percent level."
The regression presented in table 10 adds additional  variables  suggested in the empirical  growth
literature to the base Barro regression. The variables  added are: trade share of GDP averaged  over 1970
to  1988, used as a measure of trade policy (STRD7088);  money and quasimoney  as share of GDP
averaged  over 1970-88  (m27088)  used as a measure of size and development  of the financial sector;' m
the standard deviation of  inflation over  the period 1970 to  1988 used as  a  measure of  overall
macroeconomic  uncertainty (SDPI7088),  the average  of the ratio of claims on the private sector by the
central  bank and deposit  money  banks to GDP over 1970  to 1988  (DCPT7088)  (Levine  and King (1992)),
a measure suggested as a proxy for development  of financial  markets, and the average number  of war
casualties between  1970 and  1988 (Easterly,  Kremer, Pritchett and  Summers(1992)).  Whites'
Heteroskedastic  Consistent  standard  errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity. As shown in table
10, adding  these variables  affects  neither the sign nor the significance  of the coefficients  on the inequality
measures.
The results indicate  that under a broad range of assumptions,  within  the context of cross country
growth regressions, initial inequality is negatively  correlated with growth.  Hence, improving  equality
may improve future growth prospects.
9  These  instruments are chosen,  because with the exception of the socialist government dummy, they are highly significant in the first stage
regression and are exogenous.  The R
2 terms for the first stage regression ranges between .58 for the Theil index and .43 for the ratio measure.
Excluding the socialist dummy does not change the significance of the results.
20 Since money supply is a year end stock and GDP is a flow over the year,  as suggested in p
7 of Levine and King (1992) and Appendix
I of Ghmni (1992),  money supply is the average of money supply  at the end of the previous year and the end of that year.16
Table  10:  Ordinary Least Squarea with Whites'  Haeroskedastic  Consistent Standard Errors  for Augmented Barro Type Regression.
Dep Var  LGPC7088  LOPC7088  L0PC7088  L0PC7088  LOPC7088
# OF OBS  61  56  56  56  61
Constant  0.0161  0.0479  **  0.0324 **  0.0482  **  0.0221  *
(1.40)  (2.61)  (2.27)  (2.90)  (1.79)
SODPPC70  -0.0017  -0.0030 *  -0.0031  *  -0.0031 **  -0.0025 *
(-1.38)  (-1.94)  (-2.00)  (-2.02)  (-2.08)
REVC7085  0.0127  0.0038  0.0031  0.0018  0.0082
_____________  (1.06)  (0.32)  (0.27)  (0.15)  (0.72)
ASSP7085  -0.0442*  -0.0495  -0.0511  -0.0525  -0.0378
(-1.71)  (-1.55)  (-1.60)  (-1.59)  (-1.51)
PP170DVN  -0.0033  -0.0009  -0.0012  -0.0015  -0.0019
(-0.33)  (0.09)  (-0.13)  (-0.16)  (-0.20)
CPRIM60  0.0193  *  0.0211  *  0.0214 **  0.fl 10 **  0.0207  **
(2.17)  (1.96)  (2.03)  (2.;4  (2.15)
CSEC60  0.0312**  0.0263  0.0225  0.0211  0.0269**
(2.20)  (1.38)  (1.20)  (1.12)  (2.12)
SOV7088  -0.0600 *  -0.0668  *  -0.0672  *  -0.0672  *  -0.0663  ** iL____________  !(-1.85)  (-1.79)  (-1.85)  (-1.89)  (-2.03)
CS7088  -1.02  -1.77  -1.78  -1.69  -1.54
(-0.38)  (-0.68)  (-0.69)  (-0.66)  (0.58)
M27088  -0.0022  -0.0025  **  -0.0024 +  -0.0026  **  -0.0024  **
(-1.77)  (-2.55)  (-2.69)  (-2.93)  (-2.47)
SDP17088  -0.00004  0.00001  0.00002  0.00001  0.00002
(-0.55)  (0.24)  (0.38)  (0-19)  (0.25)
STRD7088  -0.0056  -0.0088  -0.0084  -0.0093  -0.0070
(-0.75)  (-1.13)  (-1.10)  (-1.24)  (-0.98)
DCPT7088  -0.0057  0.0102  0.0098  0.0081  0.0066
(-0.43)  (0.64)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (0.43)
OiNi  -0.0783 *
(-2.66)  .
THEIL  40.04,99**
______________  _______________  (-3.06)
COEFFVAR  -0.0328  **
(-3.07)
RTP40  -0.0024  *
_______  _______  ___________  _ __  (-2.28)
R-Squared  0.37  0.45  0.47  0.47  0.4217
A final topic is whether the observed relationship  between growth and inequality differs for
democracies and non democracies.  Persson and Tabellini suggest "in a society where distributional
conflict is more important, political decisions are likely to  result in policies that allow less priva.s
appropriation  and therefore less accumulation  and growth. But the growth rate also depends  on political
institutions,  for it is through the political process that conflicting  interests  ultimately  are aggregated  into
public policy decisions." 11
To test this hypothesis, an interaction  term between  regime type and inequality  is added to the
base regression. This interaction  term is a dummy variable equal to one if the country is a democracy
and zero if it is a non-democracy  multiplied  by the inequality  variables.  Hence if the t statistic  on this
term is significant, it indicates  that inequality  affects democracies  and non-democracies  in a different
manner.  Countries are classified as democracies  and non-democracies  using the following  procedure.
If a country  spent more the fifty percent of the time between 1970  and 1988  as a democracy,  as classified
in ongoing work by Cukierman, Neyapti and Webb, than it is classified as a democracy. This list is
supplemented  with the classifications  used in Alesina and Rodrik(1991)  for countries not covered in
Cukierman, Neyapti and Webb.  Table 11 shows that the coefficients on the interaction terms are
insignificant;  the coefficients  on the inequality  measures  remains significantly  negative. Hence  the null
hypotheses,  that democracies  and non-democracies  have a similar relationship  between  long term growth
and  inequality, is accepted.
" Pernon  d Tablini,  p.1.18
Table 11: Ordinary  LeastSquareawith  Whites  HeterokedasticConsistentStandard  Errors for Barro type  regression  including  inequality  measures
and interaction  term between  inequality  and political  system
Dep Vars  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
L0PC7088  LGPC7088  LOPC7088  LUPC7088
#of  Obs  68  68  68  71
Conotant  0.0467*0  0.0486**  0.0330**  0.0298**
(3.05)  (3.52)  (2.64)  (2.45)
SODPPC70  -0.0028**  -0.0029**  40.0029**  -0.0029**
_______________  (-2.09)  (-2.26)  (-2.22)  (-2.85)
REVC7085  -0.0071  -0.0095  -0.0090  -0.0093
(-0.62)  (-0.84)  (-0.79)  (-0.80)
ASSP7085  -0.0555**  -0.0550**  -0.0557$*  0.0387**
(-2.12)  (-2.23)  (-2.24)  (-2.85)
PP170DVN  -0.0057*  0.0061**  -00059*  -0.0056*
_  (-1.91)  (-2.03)  (-1.98)  (.1.82)
CPRIM60  0.0201*  0.02070*  0.0215**  0.0198
________  __  (1.85)  (2.00)  (2.05)  (1.88)4
CSEC60  0.0175  0.0087  0.0111  0.0211
_______  __  (1.04)  (0.53)  (0.67)  (1.62)
SO0V7088  -0.0226  -0.0245  -0.0252  -0.0418














__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  __  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _3_  (3.85)
RTP40DEM  -0.0012
R-Squared  0.34  0.390.38(-0.97
R-Square  0.34  0.39  0.38  10.3619
IV.  Sensitivity  Analysis
A common  criticism of cross country  growth regressions  is that both the sign and significance
of  variables in cross country growth regressions  are highly sensitive to the inclusion, or exclusion, of
variables  found to be significant  in other parts of the literature. To counter concerns  about  the robustness
of results to the inclusion  of other plausible variables, Levine and Renelt (1992) propose a vai .ant of
Leamner's  (1983)  extreme bound analysis to test the robustness.  A brief summary of the procedure
Levine and Renelt (1992)  propose follows22.
(1) Y=  ,Il  +  #mM  +  ,(ZZ  + u
The first step is to divide the independent  variables into three categories; the 1, or included
variables, the M variable, the variable of interest; and the Z variables.  The I variables are always
included in the regression, as is the M variable which in this case is inequality.  The M variables'
coefficient,  OB, is observed to  gauge its reaction to different combinations  of the Z variables.  The Z
variables  are a large pool of variables, suggested  in other empirical  and theoretical  works as potentially
important  for growth, but whose importance  is more controversial. The Z variables  are added  to the base
regression, until all combinations  have been tried, noting at each step f,t and its standard  error.  The
highest and lowest values of  the coefficient  on the variable of interest, IPm. that would be accepted at a
given significance  level are then computed  for each combination  of  Z variables. After a comparison  of
the highest acceptable  O's from all regressions, the l,B with the highest acceptable  P associated to it
becomes  the upper extreme  bound. Likewise  the P. with lowest acceptable  P associated  with it becomes
the lower extreme bound.  If the extreme bounds have the same sign, and are both significant, this
P  For the complete  description  of this form of sensitivity  analysis  see Levine  and Renelt (1992).
2  in the first part of the analysis,  following  Levine  and Renelt (1992),  up to three variables  from a pool of seven Z variables  are added at
any one time.  This is, of course,  not an exhaustive  list of possible  variables.20
indicates  that the relationship  between  the M variable and growth is not highly sensitive  to the inclusion
of other variables, providing  strong evidence  as to the robustness  of the results.
At this point, it should be noted  that all that is really needed  to show a relationship  between the
variable  of interest and growth is the sign (and significance)  of the variable  of interests' coefficient  in the
"true" growth regression. 2 '  A variable which is related to growth can become insignificant,  or switch
signs, due to the inclusion  of irrelevant Z variables, or the exclusion  of relevant Z variables.  On the
other hand, in an area such as cross country growth regressions,  where there is little agreement  on the
precise form of the growth regressions and where theory indicates  a large number of possibly relevant
variables, such a procedure may increase the readers' confidence  in the results presented.
Another concern is the division  of plausible  variables  into the I and Z variables. The I variables
used in the first section are the Barro regressors from the previous sectioil.  This base regression is
preferred to the base regression used in Levine and Renelt (1992), due to doubts about the exogeniety
of investment  (one of the I variables in Levine and Renelt (1992)), and because many regressors in the
Barro regression are significant  at the five and ten percent levels.  Results are also presented using the
Levine and Renelt (1992)  base regression. In a later section the Barro regressors that are insignificant
in the base regression, when inequality variables are included, are dropped one at a time untll all
regressors  are significant  at the ten percent level in at least one of the regressions. This further excludes
CSEC60, secondary  enrollment  rates, and REVC7085, the average number of revolutions  and coups.
The seven Z variables  are money  and quasimoney  as percent of GDP averaged  between 1970  and
1988 (M27088),  war casualties  per capita averaged  between 1970  and 1988  (CS7088),  ratio of claims on
the private sector by the central bank to GDP averaged between 19708 and 1988 (DCPT7088), the
average  inflation  rate between  1970  and 1988  (PI7088),  Standard  Deviation  of the Inflation  between 1970
and 1988 (SDPI7088),  trade share of GDP averaged between 1970  and 1988 (STRD7088),  and the ratio
2 For a discussion  of those  and other problems  in sensitivity  analysis  see McAleet,  Pagan  and Volcker  (1985).21
of the assets  of deposit  money  banks to the combined  assets  of deposit money  banks and the central bank
(BTOT7088). These variables  are chosen to proxy for aspects  of monetary  and trade policy, as well as
macroeconomic  and social stability. The base regression  includes  a proxy for fiscal policy (SGOV7088).
Throughout  the sensitivity  analysis  Whites' Heteroskedastic  Consistent  Variances  are used.
Results  are presented  below in table 12. The Gini Coefficient,  coefficient  of variation  and Theils'
index  remain significantly  negative  at the five percent level in all regres3ions. The final measure, RTP40
, is significantly  negatively  correlated with growth at the ten percent level.  These results confirm that
in a wide variety of specifications,  inequality  measures are significantly  and negatively  correlated with
growth.25
The sensitivity  analysis  is next expanded  to include more than three additional  regressors  at one
time.  In addition, two regressors from the base Barro regression that are insignificant  once inequality
measures  are included,  secondary  enrollment  rate in 1960, and average number  of revolutions  and coups
are dropped from the base regression ([ variables) and added to the pool of Z variables.3' Growth of
population, used in the base regression  in Levine and Renelt (1992) is also added to the pool of  Z
variables. All possible  combinations  of these ten variables  (with up to all ten variables  added  at the same
23  Sensitivity  Analysis  is also conducted  using the base regression  from Levine  and Renelt (1992),  which  contains  the following  variables:
initial  GDP  per Capita  (SODPPC70),  investment  share of ODP averaged  over 1970  to 1988  (SINV7088),  growth  rate of population  (LGPP7088)
and secondary  enrollment  rates (CSEC60). The seven Z-variables  used are also similar  to those used in the paper by Levine and Renelt;
government  share of GDP (SOV7088),  trade share of GDP (STRD7088),  average inflation rate (P17088),  sbndard deviation of inflation
(SDP17088),  and number of revolutions  and coups (REVC7085). To proxy  for monetary  phenomenon  slightly  different  measures  from those
used in the Levine  and  Renelt  paper were used. The measures  used were ratio of claims  on private  sector  by the central  bank  and deposit  money
banks (DCPT7088)  and ratio of money  and quasi money  to GDP (M27088). Once again, following  Levine  and Renelt, a maximum  of three
variables  were added  at the same time. Using  this specification  the Gini coefficient,  Theils' index  and coefficient  of variation  remain  significantly
negatively  cormlated  with growth at the ten percent level. RTP40 remains negatively  correlated  with growth, but becomes  insignificant  at the
convetional significance  levels  of five  and ten percent.
26  Primary enrollment  rate in 1960, although  also insignificant  in the base regression,  is not dropped.  Dropping  CSEC60  and REVC7085
from the base regression  makes  CPRIM60  significant  when RTP40  is the measure  of inequality  . In addition  human  capital  variables  have been
stssed  throughout  the literature  as especially  important  for growth. If CPRIM60  is dropped,  then in the RTP40  regression  CSBC60  becomes
significant  also. However,CPRIM60  is preferred since in the extended  regression  as shown  in table 10, it is significant  at least the ten percent
level  with all inequality  measures. Using  CSEC60  instead  of CPRIM60,  the coefficient  of variation  remains  sigificant at the five  percent  level;
Gini and Theil are sigficant  at the ten percent level, and RTP40 remains  negative,  but is insignificant  at conventional  significance  levels.22
Table 12: Results  from Sensitivity  Analysis  for Inequality  Variables,  using Barro type regression  as Base Regression
#obs  Coeff  S.E  T-stat  Included  Variables
COEFFVAR
High  67  -0.0243  0.0087  -2.81  CS7088, M27088,  SDP17088
Low  61  -0.0376  0.0095  -3.95  BTlT7088, P17088,  SDP17088.
THEIL
High  70  -0.0337  0.0128  -2.63  CS7088,  SDP17088,  STRD7088
Low  61  -0.0563  0.0147  -3.82  BTOT7088,  P17088,  SDP17088
GIN-  _I
High  67  -0.0527  0.0237  -2.22  CS7088,  M27088,  SDP17088
Low  61  -0.0868  0.0258  -3.37  BTOT7088,  SDP17088,  P17088
RTP40
High  64  -0.0020  0.0010  -1.94  CS7088,  SDP17088,  DCPT7088
il  Low  64  -0.0027  0.0009  -2.92  M27088,  BTOT7088,  STRD7088
Table 13: Extended  Sensitivity  Analysis
#obs  Coeff  S.B  T-stat  Included  Variables
COEFFVAR
High  70  -0.0237  0.0095  -2.51  STRD7088,  SDP17088,  CS7088,  LOPP7088,
CS_CE_
Low  57  40.0403  0.0118  -3.41  RBVC7085,  P17088, BTOT7088,  L0PP7088,
DCPT7088
TIM  I____  _______
High  70  -0.0341  0.1532  -2.23  STRD7088,  SDP17088,  CS7088,  LOPP7088
Low  57  -0.0591  0.0179  -3.29  REVC7085,  P17088,  SDP17088,  M27088,
BTOT7088,  LOPP7088,  DCPT7088
High  70  -0.0462  0.0240  -1.93  STRD7088,  SDP17088,  CS7088,  CSEC60,
LGPP7088
LOw  58  -0.1010  0.0280  -3.61  REVC7085,  STRD7088,  P17088,  SDPI7088,
______________  ____________  M27088,  BTOT7088
RTP40  _  __________
High  64  -0.0018  0.0011  -1.64  STRD7088,  SDPI7088,  CS7088,
DCPT7088,BTOT7088,  LGPP7088
CSEC60
Low  63  -0.0032  0.0010  -3.26  STRD7088,  REVC7085,  P17088,  SDPI7088,
M27088,  BTOT708823
time) are added  to the base regression (now  excluding REVC7085  and CSEC60  since they are included
in the pool of doubtful  variables).
The results are presented above in table 13.  Two of inequality measures, the coefficient of
variation  and Theils' index, remain significant  at the five percent level, and the Gini coefficient is still
significant  at the ten percent level. All measures  of inequality  remain negatively  correlated  with growth
in all regressions, although  the ratio measure becomes insignificant  at conventional  significance  levels.
These results confirm a robust and negative relationship  between inequality  and growth.
V.  Conclusions
In summary,  the empirical results are as follows:
1) Inequality is negatively, and robustly, correlated with growth.  This result is not highly
dependent  upon assumptions  about  either the form of the growth regression  or the measure  of inequality.
The analysis  includes a variation of Leamer's extreme bounds analysis  proposed by Levine and Renelt
(1992).
2) Although statistically  significant the magnitude of the relationship  between inequality and
growth is relatively small.  Decreasing inequality  from one standard deviation above to one standard
deviation  below the mean increases  the long term growth rate by approximately  1.3% per annum.Y
3) The correlation  between  inequality  and growth is not dependent  upon whether  the government
is a democracy  or a non-democracy. When  an interaction  term between  the type of regime and inequality
is included in the base regression it is insignificant  at conventional  significance  levels.
4) The cross country data on inequality  follows Kuznets' inverted U shape.
Some care should be taken when interpreting  these results.  Although inequality is negatively
'  Using  Gini coefficients  and coefficient  from the base Barro regression,  going from one standard  deviation  above the mean  value to one
standard  deviation  below  the mean value24
correlated with growth, this does not necessarily  imply that "soak the rich" policies will improve  long
term growth. First, theoretical  work on inequality  and growth has stressed that this negative  correlation
is caused by high levels of inequality  provoking high levels of governmental  economic intervention.
Hence, the reason for this correlation  may be that "soak  the rich" policies are less necessary  where there
is less inequality. Second, although the partial correlation is robust, the direction of causality  has not
been determined  and the effects of specific income distribution  policies have not been tested.  Finally,
looking at the empirical results, once inequality  variables are included in the base regression size of
government consumption is  negatively, although not  robustly,  correlated with  growth  in  many
specifications. Hence  if policies designed  to decrease inequality  result  in larger government  consumption
and the cost of increased  government  consumption  outweighs  the benefits of greater equality,  long term
growth may be harmed.  These results, however, do indicate quite conclusively  that inequity is not a
necessary  precondition  for growth.25
Appendix  I:  Data
The data used in the analysis is from BESD, the World Bank database with the following
exceptions'.  Per capita gross domestic product, government  share of GDP, trade share of GDP, and
investment  share of GDP are from Summers  and Heston (1991). Assassinations  per million  population,
and revolutions  and coups, are constructed  from the raw data used in the Barro-Wolf  data set.  Primary
and secondary  enrollment  rates in 1960  are obtained from the Barro-Wolf  data set, but are supplemented
with data from SOCIND, United Nations Social Indicators, which is part of the World Bank data base.
The War Casualties  data is from Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers  (1992)  and the two financial
variables, DCPT7088, the ratio of claims on the private sector by the central bank and deposit money
banks to GDP, and BTOT7088,  the ratio of the assets of deposit money  banks to the combined  assets of
deposit money  banks and the central  bank are from raw data from King and Levine (1992).  The raw
income  distribution  data used to construct  the inequality  variables comes  from four basic sources. The
primary source is SOCIND. This is supplemented  by Jain (1975), and "A Survey of National Sources
of  Income Distribution Statistics" published by the  United Nations(1981).  The quintile income
distribution  data, used for some points in RTP40, is from  Lecallion et al (1984) and United Nations
(1985).
In addition to the general problems encountered  in cross country growth regressions there are
additional problems specific to inequality  measures.'  A problem in cross country studies concerning
inequality  is that data on inequality  tends to be very sparse. To deal with this concern, as in Alesina  and
Rodrik (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1990), income distribution  is measured  in different years for
28 With  the exception  of the inequality  data, the data used in the following  analysis  is from William  Easterly  and Sergio  Rebelo, 'Fiscal
Policies  and Economic  Growth:  An Empirical  Investigation',  part of an ongoing  World  Bank  research  project 'How Do National  Policies  affect
Long  Term Growth?
29  See Easerly, King, Levine  and Rebelo  (1991)  or Levine  and Renelt (1992)  for a discussion  of common  problems  in growth regressions.26
different countries.  It would seem plausible that income distribution changes  slowly over time, which
may indicate that this is the most appropriate  way to deal with the sparseness of data.  The income
distribution data used to construct COEFFVAR, GINI and THEIL are from the eighteen year period
between 1958 (Jamaica)  and 1976 (Botswana, Dominican  republic, Italy, Nepal and El Salvador)  with
the majority  of these observations  coming  from between 1960  and 1970. Since endogeneity  is a potential
concern, data before 1970  is preferred to data from  between 1970  and 1976. The final measure  RTP40
includes additional observations  from the early eighties for a few countries.  Since these data are in
quintiles, and not deciles as used to construct  the other measures,  COEFFVAR,  GINI and THEIL  do not
include these points.27
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